dowry rights, her marriage was not seen as 'offensive to the standards of decency accepted by the English law,' (p.397) whilst more recently, in ECO New Delhi v SG, 5 a child was denied entry into the UK because she failed to meet the relevant Immigration Rules criteria. The judgment concluded that discouraging her parents' form of marriage was a legitimate aim to pursue the protection of morals. These cases all have one thing in common: they concern polygamous marriage.
In this paper I argue that current judicial attitudes towards women living in polygamous marriages in the UK are problematic. This will be shown by applying a postcolonial feminist lens to the existing case law on polygamous marriage to observe discursive patterns throughout the judgments.
The discourse analysis method adopted in this paper is inspired by Didi Herman's (2011) arguments surrounding judicial agency. Her research demonstrates that 'judges are active agents in the production of orientalist, racialized and Christian discourse ' (p.20-21) . I seek to demonstrate that this is also true in relation to polygamous marriage. The best way to discover what judges think about polygamy is to analyse what they say and for this reason, a discourse analysis is appropriate. Discourse analysis concentrates on instances where speech equates to action. A judicial decision is not merely speech but 'is intended to create an action, both in respect of the parties in the instant case and, where applicable, in future cases…' (Harding, 2012, p.434) . By looking for patterns of discourse within judicial rhetoric,
we can see what influenced and continues to influence judicial perceptions of polygamy.
Over fifty English cases were read and analysed, all of which were electronically reported.
The paper commences with an exploration of existing literature on polygamous marriages, women and the law to explain the utility of a postcolonial feminist inspired lens.
Postcolonial feminism disrupts dominant discourses and places practices and situations within their historical context. Feminist scholars use these insights to further contemporary understandings of polygamy by disrupting the dominant discourse that polygamy is harmful in itself. Disrupting this discourse then paves the way for an expansion of the harm debate to look for other sources of harm affecting women in polygamous marriages. Additionally, I
consider research on contemporary English legal responses to polygamous marriage which shows that the current legal framework is problematic, leaving women and children to suffer.
I then discuss the two concepts of orientalism and imperialism, drawing on existing scholarship to demonstrate their relevance. I argue that orientalist thought denies women's capacity to contract polygamous marriages as they are subject to orientalising and othering processes which position them and their marriage as inferior. This is manifested in the religious Christian supremacy which underscores many judgments as the courts grapple with ideals of marriage. Orientalist Christian supremacy is linked with the imperialist civilising mission as religion plays a key role in constructing and dismissing polygamous marriage. Debates surrounding the legal recognition of polygamous marriage are steeped in imperialist and nationalist rhetoric as the UK seeks to preserve the Christian monogamous ideal.
Following this, I chart the evolution of judicial attitudes towards polygamous marriage and women who engage in polygamy in the UK. From the analysis, three main arguments arise.
First that racist, imperialist, orientalist and sexist discourses are present throughout the case law on polygamous marriage. Second, these discourses intersect and intermingle to affect women in a negative manner. Third, judicial language has evolved so that in more recent times, these themes are still present but are not longer as explicit.
II. Polygamous Marriage and Women -A Postcolonial Feminist Approach
In this section, I provide a critical overview of the scholarship on polygamous marriages, women and the law, demonstrating how existing research has inspired the postcolonial feminist conceptual framework underpinning this paper.
Patriarchy, History and Postcolonial Feminism -A Conceptual Framework
Much of the research conducted on legal responses to polygamous marriage is centred on its harms. For example, Thom Brooks (2009) argues that greater harms are attached to polygamous marriage for women because it is structurally inegalitarian in practice and theory. He explains that polygamy is practically inegalitarian because it is rarely polyandrous, 6 leaving women without the opportunity to engage in polygamy in the same way as polygynous husbands. In addition, polygamy is theoretically structurally inegalitarian because although a polygynous husband can divorce any of his wives at will, the wives may divorce him but not one another. As such, they may be bound in a relationship with another wife against their wishes. These two issues lead to the conclusion that polygamous marriages are incapable of existing outside of a patriarchal framework. Bhikhu Parekh (2010) adds to this by arguing that polygamous marriages are more harmful because 6 Polyandry denotes the form of polygamy in which one wife is married to multiple husbands; polygyny is the term used for polygamous marriages involving a man married to multiple wives.
spouses feel 'dispensable' (Parekh, 2010, p.287) , whilst monogamous marriages provide a better prospect of spousal equality.
At first glance, the assertion that inequality and patriarchy underlie polygamy, does not seem especially controversial until it becomes evident that monogamy is inherently positioned as the ideal non-patriarchal and egalitarian model of marriage (Beaman 2014) .
Gillian Calder (2009) questions the reality of this ideal arguing that patriarchy transcends familial structure and to assume otherwise is naïve. This critique exposes the unfair treatment suffered by women in polygamous marriages based on the flawed assumption that patriarchy is exclusive to their form of marriage. In addition, the idealised construction of monogamous marriage is damaging to monogamous wives as the harm and patriarchal attitudes that they experience may be downplayed.
Whilst developing her thesis on minimal marriage, Elizabeth Brake (2012) questions whether 'marriages within religious traditions that subscribe to gendered spousal roles [should] be deprived of recognition ' (p.199) . She further examines the harm arguments by undertaking a more contextualised comparison between monogamy and polygyny in the 'small patriarchal religious communities within which polygyny tends to be located in the United
States ' (p.198) . In finding that polygamy's 'problematic features are not sufficiently different in kind from existing male-female monogamy to justify differential treatment…' (p.200),
Brake therefore demonstrates the importance of context to determine that the influencing factor on harm and gendered roles in these communities is patriarchy.
In other work, Joanna Sweet (2013) Brake's (2012) assertion that patriarchy is the real concern.
The work on patriarchy and harm in polygamous marriage has inspired the choice of a postcolonial feminist conceptual framework for two main reasons relating to the disruption of dominant discourses and historical consciousness. I view postcolonialism as an 'intellectual movement' (Woo, 2011, p.92 ) focussing on critiques of colonisation which situate postcolonial as a label for the study of colonial practices and their consequences.
Postcolonial feminism explores the intersection of colonial critique and gender to consider the effects of colonisation on women. Gayatri Spivak (1999) observes that colonised women are essentially constructed as brown women who need white men to save them from brown men. This serves as a starting point for understanding the characterisation of women in polygamous marriages and the harms that they suffer in English law. The mentality that brown women still need saving persists today as evidenced by the discourses surrounding other practices including the hijab.
After decolonisation, many women have used the hijab to make a political statement and declare their resistance to colonialist narratives which portray them as oppressed and forced to hide (Yeğenoğlu, 2003) . Through this resistance, women use the veil to disrupt colonialist discourses which provide them with a white saviour (Chow, 2003) . Thus, a postcolonial feminist lens serves to expose gendered and colonialist narratives in legal judgments which can then be disrupted or questioned. In doing so, steps can be taken to interrogate the assumptions and attitudes which govern approaches to polygamy in the law (for further discussion see e.g. Lewis and Mills (eds.), 2003 and Vakulenko, 2012) . The utility of such discursive disruption is further evidenced by the feminist scholarship on polygamous marriage outlined above. By exposing the presence of harm and patriarchy in monogamous marriages, the argument that polygamy is inherently harmful is successfully disrupted, informing my analysis of judicial discourse.
The second reason that I have adopted a postcolonial feminist approach concerns historical context. Jane Haggis (2003) refers to postcolonial feminism as a 'feminist historical project' (p.163) and scholars in this branch of feminism use the past to better understand and question the present. Kaganas and Murray (1991) illustrate the effectiveness of historical consciousness by grounding their analysis of South African polygyny in colonial history.
Referring back to the 'ethnocentrism of white colonizers' (Kaganas and Murray, 1991, p.125) facilitates a more nuanced deconstruction of legal approaches to South African polygyny, so that prevailing attitudes can be problematised. The use of history to contextualise the development and presence of colonial discourse is effective in advancing contemporary understandings of case law as legal judgments, especially those on marriage, are shaped by prevailing social attitudes (Probert, 2012) . This provides a clearer picture of the current situation and how the courts have arrived there, enabling us to challenge contemporary judicial attitudes towards polygamy in English law.
It is also pertinent to consider some of the research investigating attitudes to polygamy in English law in the postcolonial context. For example, Prakash Shah (2003) Building on this, I can then move towards exposing the underlying influences and views which impact upon and subordinate women in this area.
Adrien Wing (2011) has also been active in researching polygamy using a global critical race feminist approach in the UK. Wing expands critiques of polygamy to consider the broader socio-legal dynamics which shape and influence the legal framework with reference to polygamous families in Black Britannia. Along with insights provided by Shah, I use her work to examine legal and judicial attitudes towards polygamous marriage in the UK through a critical postcolonial feminist lens, thereby improving understandings of how the law responds to women who practise polygamy and why it responds in this manner.
Investigations into colonialist influences on polygamous marriage also uncover patterns of orientalist and imperialist thought which bear consideration. Drawing again on the existing research on polygamous marriage I shall now explain the interpretation and use of these two closely-linked concepts. cannot fit into because of its differences (Said, 2003) . This difference is held as evidence of the Orient's inferiority providing colonisers with knowledge which they would then use as a source of power to exercise over the backward colonial natives (Lewis, 2000) .
Critiques of orientalist behaviour in the law are effective in highlighting orientalism as a source of the western supremacy which drives imperialism and the white colonialist saviour.
Teemu Ruskola (2002 Ruskola ( -2003 orientalist thinking in the case law on polygamy enables us to understand how and why polygamy has been "othered" using western monogamy as the comparative standard.
Another theme in the polygamy literature related to "othering" is concerned with the agency of women. In her work on Mormon polygamy and religion, Rebecca Johnson (2014) observes that women are portrayed as lacking in agency when making the decision to enter into a polygamous marriage as 'a powerful social narrative presumes [their] consent to have been coerced… ' (p.110-111) . Women are subject to orientalist assumptions regarding their agency to make the right decision about their marriage, rendering their decision-making abilities inferior to women in monogamous marriages.
Johnson ( 
Imperialist Ideals: National Values and Legal Recognition
Another useful concept for analysing judicial approaches to polygamous marriage is British imperialism. Imperialism has close ties to postcolonialism because it is related to Empirebuilding and colonisation. Robert Young (2001) states that imperialism provides the motivation for the physical process of colonisation and Wolfgang Mommsen (1981) expands this to make two key arguments which underpin my use of imperialism. He first asserts that white supremacy stems from 'biological and racial variants of national imperialism' (p.8) and
should therefore be included within understandings of imperialism; and second that imperialism may also be an objective process which results in the civilised coloniser taking necessary control of a backward society. By including biological and racial characteristics, the close connection between imperialism, racism and white supremacy is displayed, indicating the importance of noting the role of these latter two concepts in judicial understandings of polygamy.
Mommsen's second argument regarding the civilising mission has become increasingly prominent in more contemporary definitions of imperialism and the reason for this evolution is attributable to decolonisation. Colonisation constitutes the most recent form of Empire-building on the basis of imperialist thought and among others, Thornton (1961 Thornton ( -1962 asserts that colonialists never saw themselves as exploiting colonies but mainly viewed themselves as 'trustees of civilisation' (p.335). Thus, colonisation was for the benefit of colonised nations and peoples.
Exposing the "civilising mission" mentality has been expanded in the research of critical scholars including Lila Abu-Lughod (1998). Although not explicit, I noted a connection in her work between the imperialist civilising mission and current ideas of modernity. The term 'backward' (Mommsen, 1981; Harshé, 1997) is frequently used to describe culture and society in former colonies and this word indicates a need to bring them forward into the present. When something is updated, it is modernised and so, modernisation is a newer and more politically correct term for civilisation, with the same objective that I identify as western imitation.
The notion of western imitation is helpful for understanding judicial discourses surrounding polygamy because, as we shall see, marriage is also constructed in accordance with western monogamous ideals. By looking for imperialist tropes within judicial discourse, the disruption of dominant colonialist narratives can be broadened to include imperialist ones.
By uncovering and questioning both colonialist and imperialist discourses within these judgments, the effects of colonisation and western supremacy on attitudes towards polygamy in the English courts can be investigated further.
It is noteworthy that existing research highlights the nation-state and its interests as a bar to legal recognition for polygamous marriage. Critiques of imperialism aid in confronting the use of national interests and Margaret Denike (2010) provides insight into this when she considers race and polygamous marriage in Canada and the US. She observes the historical connection between nationalist sentiments and marriage noting that 'anti-polygamy campaigns were deeply implicated in the alignment of normative sexual monogamy and racial Anglo-Saxonism within the imperial logic of the nation-state' (Denike, 2010, p.868) . In charting racist and imperialist patterns of thought in these campaigns she interrogates the denial of recognition for polygamous marriages and the preservation of a national monogamous identity. Sweet (2013) also addresses these ideas in her critique of Canadian nation-building discourses, concluding that the monogamous marriage ideal is viewed as essential for upholding national values and women's equality.
In addition to religious orientalism, imperialist critiques of religion and the role of Christianity are useful for evaluating the English case law on polygamous marriage. Inherent in the civilising mission is a sense of religious conversionism (Curtin, 1972) . For natives to become fully civilised, they must follow the most civilised religion: Christianity. Christianity was seen as an essential facet of life in the West and colonial natives would never be truly civilised until they had converted to this religion. As civilising has become modernising, conceptions of Empire have become more secular in nature, but the influence of religion is still a real concern, particularly in relation to marriage and the law. In applying a critical lens which looks for undercurrents of Christian imperialism in judicial attitudes towards polygamy, we can challenge the Biblical ideal of marriage as monogamous.
Existing research on polygamous marriage provides a variety of interesting perspectives and critical examinations of this practice in the law. By drawing from and combining the insights of the existing scholarship, I am able to demonstrate that applying a postcolonial feminist lens to the case law on polygamy proves effective in promoting a deeper analysis and understanding of the influences and discourses that shape and affect legal responses to polygamous marriage and women who live in such marriages in the UK.
III. Constructing Polygamy -Racism, Imperialism, Orientalism and Sexism in the English Courts
The case law discussed in this part, starts during the height of British imperial rule with Hyde (Calder, 2009, p.74) . Thus, marriages which unite more than two parties are still excluded from understandings of marriage.
In addition to this Christian supremacist discourse, there are myriad examples of orientalism and patriarchy as demonstrated in the passage:
'There are no doubt countries peopled by a large section of the human race in which men and women do not live or cohabit together upon these terms…In such parts the men take to themselves several women, whom they jealously guard from the rest of the world, and whose number is limited only by considerations of material means. But the status of these women in no way resembles that of the Christian "wife." In some parts they are slaves, in others perhaps not; in none do they stand, as in Christendom, upon the same level with the man under whose protection they live. The remainder of the passage exemplifies the intermingled Christian supremacistpatriarchal rhetoric to which women in polygamous marriages were subjected at the time.
For example, unlike a Christian wife, the women in this scenario are not seen to be on the 'same level' as the man that takes them. This idea of being on the same level is encouraging at first because it suggests that a Christian wife could enjoy a level of equality with her husband. However, when read in conjunction with the words: 'with the man under whose protection they live', traditional gender roles become visible once more. This statement is self-contradicting because a woman cannot be on the same level as a man if she needs to live under his protection. The very notion of male protection instantly places a woman in a weaker and more vulnerable position, displaying the rampant sexism in judicial discourses which not only relate to women practising polygamy but also to the Christian wife. This discourse exemplifies Rebecca Probert's (2007) argument that rather than defining marriage, Hyde 14 should instead be seen as a defence of marriage in 1866 which was shaped by its context. During this time, women were viewed as weaker and it is unsurprising that they were constructed in such patriarchal terms. Nevertheless, when combined with the imperialist and orientalist superiority displayed towards women in polygamous marriages, a hierarchy remains in which the Christian wife holds a higher value.
This passage also feeds into the debates discussed earlier surrounding women's agency. In the judgment, polygamous wives are portrayed as lacking the protection of an English husband which can only be enjoyed by the Christian wife. Drawing on Spivak's (1999) Elsewhere in the judgment, the Baralong are portrayed as a 'barbarous or semi-barbarous tribe…beyond the limits of the British dominion' (Bethell, 1887, p.232) . This is the first overtly racist discourse in the judgement and stems from the imperialist and orientalist notion that as the tribe is living beyond the British dominion, 18 and outside the reach of the civilised British authority, it must be 'barbarous'. To characterise a people in this way is dehumanising and insulting because to be barbarous, is to be uncivilised; cruel; coarse and unrefined (R.E. Allen (ed.) 1990). Such racist discourse supports Mommsen's (1981) arguments regarding the use of racial and biological differences to bolster and underpin white supremacy and imperialism. At this time, the inferiority of a colonised people was 18 I treat this as a synonym for British Empire. Judges were now willing to entertain claims related to potentially polygamous marriages as by conforming to a de facto monogamous structure they were no longer deemed "offensive" or unlawful. In addition, Winn J was cognisant of the difficulties that women who are party to a 'Mohammedan marriage' face after coming to the UK declaring that:
'…it is better that the court should recognise in favour of women who have come here as a result of a Mohammedan marriage the right to obtain from their husband what was promised to them by enforcing the contract and payment of what was so promised, than that they should be bereft of those rights and receive no assistance from the English courts.' (Shahnaz, 1964, p.401-402) This sympathetic policy statement is demonstrative of the progress made by the courts to adopt a proactive attitude towards the rights of women in potentially polygamous marriages celebrated overseas. It could also be attributed to the courts becoming more accustomed to seeing such cases, as immigration from polygamy-permitting colonies into the UK became more prevalent (Shah, 2003) . This in turn led to a willingness rather than outright dismissal to hear these women and their issues.
That being said, the colonial saviour theme is also prevalent in this statement, reflecting a persistent lack of development in cultural perceptions of gender. The suffering of women who come here is attributed to their 'Mohammedan marriage' rather than the courts' attitude to that marriage. This constitutes a protection narrative, in which the court protects a potentially polygamous wife by enforcing her rights. Pathak and Rajan (1992) argue that such discourses of protection disguise power politics as '[a]n alliance is formed between the protector and protected against a common opponent...
[which]…conceals the opposition between protector and protected, a hierarchical opposition that assigns higher value to the first term ' (p.263) . This alliance and its protection come at the price of othering the wife by blaming her relationship and the new problems it has created for the law.
Further into the 1960s and 70s another theme relating to entitlement to public money arose in the late 1960s which is still relevant today. In this area, individuals -mainly women and children living in polygamous families -were deemed an unacceptable burden on the state.
The courts have sought to protect state funds from abuse by those in polygamous marriages as shown in Imam Din v National Assistance Board. 27 Here, a man abandoned his second wife and their children in the UK, leaving them destitute and reliant on the National Assistance Board for financial provision. It was held that there was no good reason to deny recognition to the wife and children as being lawfully related under Pakistani law to the deserter husband so that he could not 'avoid all responsibility and thereby throw the whole burden of maintaining his wife and children upon the public' (Imam, 1967, p.218) . As Salmon J stated: 'I can find no such reason, and every reason in common sense and justice why they should be recognised ' (Imam, 1967, p.218 marriage prevented the use of public money and forced a man to take responsibility for his second family, whilst also implying that that the maintenance of the polygamous wife and children is a burden on the state.
The court's attitude stems from the privatisation of responsibility for welfare that is at the heart of the neoliberal state in the UK today. Whitehead and Crawshaw (2012) explain that as a result of neoliberalism, societal institutions are now expected to function as 'business corporations whose rationale is profit generation' (p.233). As such, the line between the public service and private sectors has become increasingly blurred. In Imam, 28 recognition of the polygamous marriage negated state responsibility for the welfare of the wife and children, placing the burden on the husband, but also placing this family in a vulnerable position. Even with a legal order, there was no guarantee that the husband would take financial responsibility, leaving this woman and her children at the mercy of a man who has previously refused to fund their needs. In addition to this vulnerability, the wife has been treated undeserving of aid by the state because of her polygamous marriage. To save state funds, the court created a gap between the provision of state aid which was denied to them and private aid for which there was no guarantee of payment leaving the woman and children in an untenable situation of uncertainty and financial insecurity. opine that the wife's lack of entitlement to social security benefits was:
'…unfortunate and anomalous… [because she] …should be treated just like any English wife is she was in fact her husband's only wife throughout their period of residence in England' (Law Commission, 1971, p.42 ).
This statement exposes the key source of suffering for women in polygamous marriages:
judicial interpretations of their marriage ensure that they are treated differently and to their detriment. This differentiation is an orientalist othering process in which the courts deny a woman social security relief because she and her marriage are different from their monogamous ideal. Unfortunately, the Law Commission's opinion had little effect on later case law as evidenced by the later Nabi 32 judgment.
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During the Nabi 33 decision, whilst interpreting the meaning of 'his wife' in s.8(1) of the Income and Corporation Taxes Act 1970, Vinelott J stated 'it seems to me to read the expression "his wife" as meaning "a wife" or "any wife" would be to do too great violence to the language of the section' (Nabi, 1981, p.1058). The word 'violence' is troubling as it connotes an extreme reaction to the inclusion of polygamous wives within the scope of this provision. In Vinelott J's opinion, including polygamous marriage would cause significant harm on par with physical damage to the section. This choice of words is reminiscent of the strong language used nearly a century earlier in Bethell. 34 In both cases, there is a feeling of disturbance at the thought of polygamy and even though the much earlier Bethell 35 judgment is more explicit, the statement in Nabi 36 demonstrates that these patterns of intolerant discourse are still present.
By recognising the two marriages to prevent the husband claiming two lots of tax relief, the court had a clear agenda of preserving and protecting state funds. This could harm the second wife as the recognition of her polygamous marriage deprived her husband of a tax benefit linked to her maintenance which remained with respect to the first wife. The second wife was disadvantaged and both her financial security and position were affected. The decision impressed upon her that as a second wife, she was not worthy of the same status as the first wife and her husband would not benefit from their marriage as much as he does from his first, leading again to financial loss and a sense of inferiority. The message of inferiority running through these two cases is both orientalist and patriarchal. The wives have been othered and subordinated through their depiction as a burden on everyone because their polygamous marriage is not suited for the welfare state's construction and regulation of marriage. When compared to the much earlier Bethell, 37 it is also noteworthy that whilst judicial attitudes towards recognition have evolved, the courts' aim remains the same at this stage: to deny relief and assistance to polygamous wives and their children. The problematic discourses surrounding polygamous marriages are still present in the case law at this stage and are negatively impacting upon women who engage in polygamy.
(III.) Late 1990s -Potential for Progress?
As we move closer to the present day, the courts appear to be more accustomed to dealing with polygamy. During this period, the statutory framework also developed to reflect the judicial tolerance for potentially polygamous marriage with s.5(1) Private International Law 38 [1996] 1 FLR 128. Hereafter Misra.
(Superannuation) Regulations 1980. 39 Consequently, the existing pension amount was divided equally between the two wives. No additional support was to be given to one over the other and even if one wife were to pass away, her share would not be given to the other wife.
Misra 40 is a fascinating development in the recognition precedent because the marriages were held valid for the purpose of awarding pensions to both widows. There was no agenda for protecting monogamy or preventing the abuse of public funds and the rights of these polygamous widows were recognised and upheld so that ostensibly they may benefit. The courts are generally more focussed on the money rather than the polygamous wife claimant but they are still willing to uphold her interests provided there is no conflict with state interests. There is no explicit reasoning for the superannuation scheme providing for polygamous widow pensions but delving into NHS history provides some explanation. Snow and Jones (2011) state that a national shortage of doctors by the 1960s led to overseas recruitment from former British colonies. In recruiting such a large proportion of staff from nations with a history of polygamy, the NHS could have expanded the scheme as an incentive to accommodate immigrant personnel. This case is significant because it shows that the courts are capable of dealing with polygamous marriage without being openly sexist, racist, imperialist or orientalist.
39 This provides for the entitlement of a widow to an 'annual widow's pension' and is supplemented by reg 9 of the National Health Service (Superannuation) Amendment Regulations 1989. In this case, the two wives were 'entitled to an equal share of the death gratuity…provided that such a share…shall not be increased by reason of the death of any other wife so entitled.'
40 [1996] 1 FLR 128.
Despite this positive change, another concurrent harmful attitudinal discourse reinforces the inferior status of polygamous wives. The two wives here were still penalised because one wife's half of the pension was non-transferable to the other upon death. Thus, unlike a monogamous wife, a polygamous wife is only eligible for half a pension, which is damaging.
The monogamous wife and her marital choice remain privileged and she is rewarded for her conformity to the dominant Western paradigm. Polygamous wives are denied access to a whole pension, demonstrating the disparity of treatment in the courts based on the imperialist perception that a polygamous marriage has a fraction of the value of an ideal monogamous marriage. focussing on the man, the widow and her needs were side-lined based on her polygamous marriage. Polygamous widows are left to suffer the consequences because the court deems it 'wrong' to divide their deceased husband's social security contributions between them.
Bibi v Chief Adjudication Officer
Women are again placed in a position of inferiority: they are made to feel like an unfair burden on the state because of their non-monogamous marriage. Thus, although some progress occurs in Misra, 44 polygamous marriages are still being recognised to protect state interests and idealise monogamy. This leads to the conclusion that underlying attitudes and approaches towards polygamous marriage have changed less than it would seem at this stage and are affecting women the same way that Teepoo was affected over a century earlier.
(IV.) 1990s through to the Present Day -Immigration and Human Rights
More recently, cases on polygamy have mainly arisen in an immigration context. Judicial discourse is less openly imperialist and orientalist, with the courts preferring the "protect public interests" approach. As illustrated in the above section, the preservation of monogamy is a modernised form of imperialist and orientalist thinking as women in polygamous marriages are subordinated by being positioned as a burden on the state. In existing research, Beaman (2014) identifies the use of idealised monogamy as the comparator against which polygamy is measured and found wanting. Due to their marriage running contrary to monogamous ideals, women are orientalised by the assumption that their arrival in the UK will be problematic for the state.
43 [1967] '…has always lived with her mother in a house which is shared with her brother and his family…her brother considers it unacceptable that his sister should be condemned to her present life, being separated from her husband. He feels it is a matter of shame to his family that his sister has never gone to her husband's house to live with him. ' (Begum, 1995, p.1) 46 Bethell (1887) 38 Ch. D 220.
47 Imam [1967] 2 WLR 257.
48 [1995] EWCA Civ J1201-1. Hereafter Begum.
As a result of her marriage, Hasna Begum was living in a difficult situation away from her husband, whilst he lived with his first wife and their children in the UK. The reference to 'shame' is also telling as it unearths another form of harm to women in polygamous marriages which is not as prevalent in existing literature. In Part II, I explored the concept of harm as a tool to promote negative perceptions of polygamy, with scholars like Kaganas and Murray (1991) extension her children and the refusal of a child's entry is therefore tied up with that of its polygamously married mother. In keeping with the imperialist theme of preserving monogamy, the courts are willing to recognise the existence of polygamous marriage again to serve the interests of immigration rather than the desire of the wives and children affected.
Later in the ECO New Delhi v SG 59 judgment, Blake J mentions that:
'…the modest contribution to the discouragement of such marriages in Nepal or elsewhere is a legitimate aim in pursuit of morals and the rights of others particularly the pursuit of gender equality.' (ECO New Delhi v SG, 2012, para 47) The question of morality and polygamous marriages arises again in this very recent case displaying the presence of orientalist discourses in current case law. At several points before this statement is made, 60 it is stressed that the child was not denied entry because of her parents' marriage but because she failed to meet the relevant criteria in the Immigration
Rules. This therefore provokes the question of why it was necessary to explain and These recent immigration and human rights cases continue to perpetuate the same problematic discourses which have been appearing throughout the case law for more than a century, the only difference being that there are fewer explicit discursive markers. The language may have changed but the same imperialist, orientalist and patriarchal influences prevail causing women in polygamous marriages to suffer greater harm because of their marital status.
IV. Conclusion
Over the years, the courts have been compelled to deal with numerous issues regarding polygamous marriage. In this paper I explored judicial responses to this form of marriage and women living in these marriages, arguing that current judicial attitudes towards women living in polygamous marriages in the UK are problematic. A postcolonial feminist lens was applied to existing case law to observe discursive patterns throughout the judgments, providing insight into the factors which influence English legal responses to polygamy.
Using existing scholarship on polygamous marriages from several jurisdictions, I explained the relevance of an international postcolonial feminist inspired conceptual framework.
Postcolonial feminism encourages us to disrupt dominant discourses and adopt a historically 61 I interpret this as "everywhere". demonstrated that orientalist Christian supremacy is connected to the imperialist civilising mission as religion plays a key role in dismissing polygamous marriage.
Building on research on contemporary western legal responses to polygamous marriage which note the harms to women in polygamous marriage, I charted the development of judicial attitudes towards polygamous marriage and women who engage in polygamy in the UK. From the analysis, three main arguments arose. First that racist, imperialist, orientalist and sexist discourses are present throughout the case law on polygamous marriage. Second, that these discourses intersect and intermingle to portray polygamy in a negative manner, subordinating and causing harm women who are living in polygamous marriages. Finally, judicial language has evolved so that in more recent times, the themes of discourse identified are no longer as explicit. However, these attitudes still permeate the case law, in a subtler form centred upon considerations of 'public good' and pursuing the protection of others. Based on these findings, it is evident that current judicial responses to polygamous marriage need to be re-evaluated to address the harms suffered by women based on their choice of marriage.
